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Abstract
We characterize access to empirical objects in biology from a theoretical perspective. Unlike objects in current
physical theories, biological objects are the result of a history and their variations continue to generate a history. This
property is the starting point of our concept of measurement. We argue that biological measurement is relative to a
natural history which is shared by the different objects subjected to the measurement and is more or less constrained
by biologists. We call symmetrization the theoretical and often concrete operation which leads to considering
biological objects as equivalent in a measurement. Last, we use our notion of measurement to analyze research
strategies. Some strategies aim to bring biology closer to the epistemology of physical theories, by studying objects
as similar as possible, while others build on biological diversity.
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1. Introduction
Science and more specifically biology and medicine
are facing a crisis where systematic attempts to repro-
duce experiments published in reputable journals fail
in the majority of cases (Begley & Ellis, 2012; Baker,
2016). The management and organization of scientific
institutions have been investigated, and the pressure to
publish has been heavily criticized (Begley & Ioannidis,
2014; Lancet, 2018). In the case of experimental biology,
theoretical and philosophical analyses can also play a
role to understand and respond to this crisis (Nadin,
2017). There are aspects proper to biological experi-
ments that should be analyzed systematically in light of
the current understanding of living beings. This discus-
sion is also particularly relevant now that the scientific
focus on (Big) Data analyses bears the risk of forgetting
that data are generated in specific empirical conditions
(Leonelli, 2014). Data detached from these conditions
without proper justification do not carry a genuine sci-
entific meaning.
A scientist cannot assume that her access to reality
is one of an omniscient daemon. Understanding what
it means to observe natural phenomena is fundamental.
This question is multi-faceted. Part of it pertains to the
complementary knowledge advocated by Chang (2004),
but part of the answer should be principled, in the rele-
vant theoretical framework. We concur with Einstein’s
epistemological statement: “whether you can observe a
thing or not depends on the theory which you use. It is
the theory which decides what can be observed” (A. Ein-
stein quoted in Salam, 1990). In physics, measurement
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is described in theories and is a fundamental part of their
formulation. The notion of measurement embedded
in theories provides a general link between the output
of measurement and the theoretical and mathematical
description of the objects of study. For example, mea-
surements in classical mechanics provide approximate
results while they change objects in quantum mechan-
ics. There are many other aspects of measurement which
are philosophically important; however, in this article,
we aim to ground widely shared practices on theoretical
principles.
Biologists often use physical concepts, and measure-
ment is no exception. The notion of measurement of
classical mechanics is widely used in biology. Moreover,
Wagner (2010) and Houle et al. (2011) advocate the use
of measurement theory in biology. This setting leads us
to inquire whether biology requires a distinct notion of
measurement. In the literature, there is at least one such
account: following the informational metaphor, molec-
ular biology often considers measurement as a classical
measurement applied to finite, entirely discrete features:
the sequences of nucleotides. A classical measurement
has a limited precision, but knowing finite, discrete struc-
tures with a sufficient finite precision means knowing
them exactly (Schrödinger, 1944). The same reasoning
appliesmutadis mutandis to other discrete structures such
as the topology of networks (Huneman, 2018). This rea-
soning only applies to the discrete aspect of the objects,
and not the continuous ones such as position in physical
space.
This point of view is in contrast with experimental
methodologies which are very rich and sometimes subtle
(Weber, 2004; Kohler, 1994). In this paper, we argue
that general theoretical principles of biology leads to a
theoretical account of biological measurement which
clarifies several aspects of experimental methodologies.
Measurement requires commensurability. For ex-
ample, measuring the length of an object requires to
identify the distance between its edges with the length of
another object such as a ruler. It also requires abstract
constructs: in this example not only a theory of space
(or space-time) but also assumptions on the object mea-
sured. These assumptions ensure that the measurement
has a meaning (Houle et al., 2011). For example, when
measuring a length, is the object solid, or flexible, does
it have well-defined boundaries, like a box, or not, like a
cloud. As a result, measurement is never only about a
single object (token). In biology, the measurement of
a part or an aspect of an organism may be performed
by the commensurability with a physical object, for ex-
ample, the length (in meters) of this organism, here and
now, measured in physical units. However, this alone is
only sufficient to know if we can put it ”as is” in a box of
a given length. The biological meaning of a length and
the procedure to assess it are very different for a tree or a
snake. Therefore, we posit that biological measurement
is not only about the intended part or aspect, but also has
to accommodate the organismmeasured and its commen-
surability with other organisms. We will develop mostly
the latter idea since it has not been systematically ana-
lyzed and raises questions which are proper to biology.
To address the specificities of biological measurement
and conceptualize the commensurability of organisms,
we need theoretical insights on organisms.
We use the principles proposed recently for a theory
of organisms (Mossio et al., 2016; Montévil et al., 2016;
Soto et al., 2016a). This framework provides a concep-
tual continuity between the understanding of organisms
and evolution. In particular, it emphasizes historical
analyses both for phylogenesis and ontogenesis.
In this framework, biological objects are not defined
theoretically like objects in physical theories. The theo-
retical definition of objects is mathematical in physics.
Despite quantitative differences, the changes of a well-
defined object are assumed to follow an underlyingmath-
ematical structure. Invariants and invariant preserving
transformations (symmetries) define these mathematical
structures (Van Fraassen, 1989; Longo&Montévil, 2014).
For example, a falling stone follows the same equation
during its fall despite its changes of position and velocity,
and a falling log would follow the same equation. As a
result, physicists can talk about the generic phenomenon
of falling bodies. Physical notions of measurement apply
to generic objects, and the reproducibility of physical
experiments is guaranteed, at least statistically, once the
same generic conditions apply.
By contrast, biological objects are historical in the
sense that their organizations stem from an evolution-
ary and individual history and continue to produce a
history. This idea has been developed theoretically and
called the principle of variation (Montévil et al., 2016).
To an extent, this principle is in line with earlier ideas, in
particular, the contingency thesis of Beatty (1995) and
the centrality of historicity defended by Gould (2002,
chap. 11) in a critical assessment of the work of D’Arcy
Thomson. For example, a falling tetrapod is not a purely
physical notion since “tetrapod” is a biological concept.
In the atmosphere, tetrapods do not just fall, some fly
and others are gliders. All these behaviors require differ-
ent equations, and these changes of equation depend on
the underlying evolutionary history. This basic example
illustrates the general idea that biological objects should
not be conceived as generic and are prone to more pro-
found changes than objects in physics, including the
appearance of new possibilities (Montévil, 2018). More-
over, biological objects are contextual in the sense that
their organizations depend on their past and current con-
texts. In other words, describing biological objects does
not just involve many quantities, but quantities which
are endowed with different biological meaning, and new
relevant quantities can appear over time.
In a nutshell, biologists manipulate objects which are
understood theoretically as the result of a history and
continue to produce a history: diachronic objects. With
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these ideas stemming from the theory of evolution in
mind, experimental reproducibility is not a straightfor-
ward notion. Biological objects tend spontaneously to
vary whereas perfect reproducibility, even statistically,
would require fixed physiology and development, at least
at an abstract level.
In section 2, we introduce how several physical the-
ories define measurement and the epistemological and
theoretical roles this notion plays. Section 3 discusses
the theoretical nature of biological measurement. Bi-
ological measurements accommodate natural histories
and contexts, not just quantities. Section 4 explores sev-
eral implications of our framework. In particular, we
classify different research strategies to handle biological
measurement.
2. Measurement in physics
In order to exemplify our aims in biology, we discuss
briefly how themain physical theories conceptualizemea-
surement. We are interested in measurement considered
in principle in general theoretical frameworks and not in
specific experimental situations. For the theory, what
does “obtaining quantities” in experiments or observa-
tions means? These accounts are sufficiently general to
be valid for any practical situation in the corresponding
theory, and they have deep practical and theoretical con-
sequences.
2.1. Classical measurement
In classical mechanics, a system has a pointwise state
in the space of possible states. The empirical access to
this state is approximate: a measurement has a finite
precision, 𝜖, which can in principle be arbitrarily small.
Thus, the state of a system is a point, and the result of
the measurement is an interval. Classical measurement
is ametrical notion: it stems from the concept of distance.
Classical dynamics are deterministic, but measure-
mentsmay ormay not allow to predict the subsequent tra-
jectory. Unpredictable dynamics such as chaotic dynam-
ics are called sensitive to initial conditions. The notion
of measurement articulates determinism and random-
ness in the sense of theoretical impredictability (Gillies,
2012; Longo &Montévil, 2017). This example shows that
a simple notion of measurement can have far-reaching
conceptual consequences.
2.2. Quantum measurement
In quantum mechanics, measurement involves the
commensurability of a microscopic object and a macro-
scopic object. Quantum measurement changes the ob-
ject and leads to quantum randomness. Informally, a
quantum state can be decomposed for a given measure-
ment as the superposition (the sum) of different states
called eigenstates. Each of them corresponds to a single
obtainable result. Performing the measurement means
that the state of the system becomes an eigenstate asso-
ciated with the quantity obtained. The other eigenstates
in the initial superposition disappear irreversibly. Quan-
tum measurement has an algebraic (and geometric) na-
ture.
There is an internal coherence to this notion. Per-
forming the same measurement twice in a row will lead
to the same result because the state of the object is al-
ready an eigenstate associated with this result: the result
obtained in the first measurement is the only possible
outcome in the second.
Different observables do not necessarily lead to the
same decomposition. An eigenstate which corresponds
to a specific position, for example, does not correspond
to a specific velocity and the other way around. Then,
measuring the position, measuring the velocity and mea-
suring the position again will not necessarily lead to the
same position twice. Lastly, some authors argue that,
in an experiment, a measurement is needed to put the
system in a known initial state (Mugur-Schächter, 2002).
The typical theoretical structure of an experiment is then:
measurement, time evolution (Schrödinger equation typ-
ically), measurement.
2.3. Reference frame
Experimenters choose space-time reference frames ar-
bitrarily to represent concrete situations and describe fea-
tures such as positions quantitatively. Relativity (Galilean,
special and general) states how the description of a situ-
ation in one reference frame can be transformed into the
description of the same situation in another reference
frame and ensures that these descriptions are coherent.
This concept overcomes the arbitrary choices of refer-
ence frames, and its mathematical nature is geometric.
2.4. Conclusion
The concepts of physical measurement we described
are principles in their respective theory, and they are very
different. Their common point is that they all describe
the role of the experimenter and its instruments in an
abstract and very concise way.
3. A theoretical account of biological measurement
To describe our theoretical notion of biological mea-
surement, we rely mainly on the principle of variation
(Montévil et al., 2016). This principle builds on evolu-
tionary biology and states that biological objects can vary
in a stronger sense than objects described by physical
theories. The latter change, but physicists understand
their changes by underlying stable mathematical struc-
tures. Instead, biological variations in the strong sense
require changing mathematical structures. Biological
objects are formed by a cascade of such variations and
the notions of historicity and contextuality become fun-
damental. Figure 1 summarizes this perspective which
guides our analysis of biological measurement.
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Figure 1: Theoretical structure of biological objects, after Montévil et al. (2016). In biology, organisms are not described theoretically by invariants and
invariant preserving transformations (symmetries) which would provide a generic meaning to the features observed. Instead, their regularities
are constraints that come from an history and collectively maintain each other in a given context. These constraints can change over time as the
objects continue to generate a history over physiologic, developmental and evolutive time scales. An account of biological measurement has to
accommodate simultaneously the measured aspects (constraints) and the rest of the organism which we describe as a specific object.
In physics, objects can be highly simplified and re-
main relevant for physics. For example, it is sound to
study a material composed only of iron. In biology, this
is not the case. For example, looking at one or several
molecules alone pertains to biochemistry, not biology.
In biology, the measured features of organisms or cells,
such as the concentration of molecules or the shape of
tissues, are measured in organisms or cells and are gen-
erally produced and maintained by them (Mossio et al.,
2016; Montévil & Mossio, 2015). Therefore, our discus-
sion of biological measurement is not limited to the parts
observed per se. Instead, our approach of measurement
accommodates both the parts observed and the organ-
isms associated. Both are reported carefully in empirical
studies, and we posit that they are elementary aspects of
biological measurement. This section may be seen as the
theorization of a typical “method section” in any experi-
mental paper in biology.
3.1. Phylogenetic classification and nomenclature of biological
objects
Reporting a biological measurement starts with de-
scribing the organisms observed and naming them. The
theoretical and philosophical underpinnings of these
names are an essential aspect of biological measurements.
The standard, general way to name organisms is to use
systematics. Biologists always use this method, even
though other methods can complement it, as discussed
in the following section.
We want to emphasize two aspects of this method
that impact the concept of measurement. The first is the
definition of the names themselves and the second is the
phylogenetic classification of living beings (de Queiroz,
1992; Lecointre & Le Guyader, 2006).
In order to provide stability to the meaning of the
names used to describe living beings, systematics estab-
lish and follow strict rules to describe new species and
other clades (e.g., genus, family). Nomenclature codes
use the principle of typification. Typification means that
defining a name requires a type. For example, the defini-
tion of a name at the family level requires a genus-level
type, a genus-level name requires a species type, and de-
scribing a new species (or subspecies) requires referring
to one specimen (holotype) or several specimens (syn-
type) which are kept in a collection (CZN International,
1999; McNeill et al., 2012, art. 72.3 and 40 resp.). Typi-
fication ensures the stability of the definition of names
even if the classification changes. Name-bearing types
are required to be in a biologically inactive state and thus
are fixed reference objects (McNeill et al., 2012, art. 8.4).
Typification implies that the definition of biological
names ultimately depends on specific, static, material
objects (Grandcolas, 2017). This situation is in contrast
with the theoretical definitions in the International Sys-
tem of Unit based on physical theories. For example,
a meter is the distance traveled by light in vacuum in
1/299792458 seconds. This definition refers to matter but
does not need the conservation of a specific object. In-
stead, it uses the generic, theoretical object called “light
in the vacuum” which has an invariant velocity in both
special and general relativity1.
Names associatedwith specificmaterial objects (types)
are not sufficient for scientific practices. In order to en-
dow names with a more general meaning, systematics
1Historically, the definition of a meter has first been theoretical,
then it used a standard prototype. The current definition is again
theoretical.
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Figure 2: Principle of the phylogenetic classification. LEFT : a schematic representation of the genealogy of a few species over evolutionary timescales.
This genealogy is not observable as such. MIDDLE: the consequence of evolution is the presence of diverse life forms, some of which are used by
biologists as types. Name-bearing types formally define names. Names are then extended to the specimens of the same species. RIGHT: the
characters that the specimens share and do not share are used to assess their evolutionary proximity with a mathematical model of evolution.
Acceptable groups are defined as the descent of a theoretical common ancestor and lead to a classification.
uses the phylogenetic classification method (de Queiroz,
1992; Lecointre & Le Guyader, 2006). This method clas-
sifies living beings by estimating their genealogy. The
genealogy is a theoretical concept that stems from the
theory of evolution; however, the genealogy of current
organisms spans billions of years, and human observers
cannot access it directly. As a result, the phylogenetic
classification uses different concepts than a genealogical
tree. For example, it is impossible to determine whether
a fossil species is an ancestor of a current species, but it
is possible to establish that they are closely related ge-
nealogically. The phylogenetic method distinguishes a
theoretical level and an observable level which is remi-
niscent of the distinction between a state and what can
be observed in physics.
The phylogenetic classification assesses the evolution-
ary proximity between different organisms. Systematists
start with the characters characterizing the different or-
ganisms, including DNA sequences. These characters are
used by a computationalmethodwhich provides a nested
hierarchy of groups, see figure 2. These methods typi-
cally assume that the most likely situation minimizes the
number of evolutionary changes, and in particular the
appearance of novelties. These analyses lead to classifi-
cations where acceptable groups, called monophyletic
groups or clades, are the descent of a common theoreti-
cal ancestor. The classification can then be used for tax-
onomic purposes. Of course, evolutionary reasonings
guide the choice of the characters and the computational
method used, and these choices are commonly debated.
Clades are defined by their estimated historical origin
and not by their current ecological status or physiology.
Since the definition of clades is based on a historical
analysis, it accommodates the diversity and diversifica-
tion of living beings straightforwardly. For example,
the famous goat (Capra aegagrus hircus) discussed by
West-Eberhard (2003) is a paradigmatic example of de-
velopmental plasticity because it is bipedal: a significant
change occurred in a single specimen. Despite its pecu-
liarities, this specimen is still part of the subspecies C.
aegagrus hircus because the subspecies is defined by its
historical origin, not by its properties.
Biological observations typically refer to a specific
clade, usually a species or subspecies. By definition of a
clade, this only ascertains a given shared theoretical an-
cestor. This common past involves similarities between
the specimens studied, but it does not guarantee that
the properties of interest in a given investigation will be
similar or even exist.
3.2. Observed and controlled genealogy
The design and description of typical biological ex-
periments use genealogical elements that go beyond
what systematics can provide. Genealogical knowledge
is provided by the direct observation of the lineages lead-
ing to the specimens studied and can be more or less
comprehensive. Of course, direct genealogical knowl-
edge is limited to the historical period where biologists
follow the appropriate methods, that is to say, about a
century at best.
Usually, direct genealogical knowledge goes with
more or less control over the genealogy. In the case
of organisms reproducing sexually, there are two main
strategies to control genealogies: establishing inbred
or outbred strains, see figure 3A. Inbred strains stem
from several generations of inbreeding. By enforcing
this behavior, biologists aim to obtain a genetically ho-
mogeneous population. Inbred strains still change over
time at least as a consequence of genetic drift. These
changes lead to the definition of substrains that have
biologically relevant differences and are not interchange-
able (Simpson et al., 1997). By contrast, outbred strains
aim to maintain heterozygote populations while keeping
as much genetic homogeneity as possible. These strains
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are more genetically labile than inbred strains and are of-
ten considered more variable phenotypically (Chia et al.
2005; Festing 2014, however see Jensen et al. 2016).
A specific nomenclature for strains completes the
nomenclature deriving from systematics. For example,
a widespread strain in biomedical research is the inbred
mouse strain C57BL/6 (Black 6) (Festing, 2014). Nam-
ing strains to report an experiment includes the breeding
institution. For example, C57BL/6NCrl are Black 6 mice
from the National Institutes of Health (N) and which
are bred by Charles River Laboratory (Crl) (Sacca et al.,
2013).
The choice of strain can profoundly impact experi-
mental results. For example, Black 6 mice have singular
features such as their nociception (sensation of pain)
(Mogil et al., 1999). Isaacs (1986) tested the incidence
of tumors in rats exposed to the carcinogen DMBA and
found that this incidence is 0%, 15%, 40% and above
90% depending on the strain used. The sensitivity to en-
docrine disruptors also depends on the strain (Spearow
et al., 1999).
In the case of cells, the situation is overall similar to
the case of animals. Cell lines and sub-lines are estab-
lished, named, and exchanged between laboratories. For
example, the first laboratory immortal human cell line,
the HeLa cell line, originated from a single patient, Hen-
rietta Lacks (who died in 1951) and thus HeLa cells have
a common origin. This cell line is widely used, and more
than 99000 references in PubMed mention it (08/2018).
Cell lines have two specificities (fig. 3B). First, a single
cell can originate a clonal population in common cases.
Second, the use of frozen samples enables biologist to
“stop” biological time. Biologists use these operations to
obtain populations of cells that are far closer genealogi-
cally to their common ancestor than cells which would
be proliferating with variations in culture.
Both animal strains and cell lines can be modified
for research purposes, either by artificial selection for a
specific trait or by genetic engineering, a subject exten-
sively discussed byKohler (1994) in the case ofDrosophila
melanogaster. These modifications are not only aiming
for a specific new trait; they include ruling out animals
with spontaneous, problematic mutations.
It is standard practice to communicate live sample
between research laboratories or between breeding in-
stitutions (Kohler, 1994, chap. 5). Communicating live
samples is required for biologists to ensure that the speci-
mens studied in different laboratories are close genealogi-
cally and carry the same spontaneous or artificial changes
if any. Commitment to perform these exchanges is re-
quired to publish in many journals. Replicating an ex-
periment using specimens from a controlled genealogy
requires an exchange of matter, a point that we discuss
in section 4.1.
Genealogies are not limited to cell division and sexual
reproduction. Viruses lead to horizontal transfers, biol-
ogists use a diversity of manipulations, such as chimera
obtained by the fusion of different zygotes. Last, some
authors consider that microbiomes should be consid-
ered as parts of organisms which implies that several
lineages come together to form a holobiont (Gilbert,
2014). These examples are beyond the basic concept of
genealogy but fit a broader concept of genealogy sensu
the historical origins of specimens.
The use of controlled strains and cells lines is not uni-
versal in biological experiments. For example, cells may
come directly from recent human samples, and animals
may come from captures in the wild. However, the prac-
tice of using sometimes very tightly controlled genealo-
gies is widespread, in particular in biomedical research.
The active control of genealogies, including modifica-
tions, leads to a situation where the natural history of
the specimens is entangled with the human history of
biological sciences (see Kohler, 1994, for a discussion in
the case of D. melanogaster).
The knowledge and control over part of the recent
genealogy of the specimens experimented upon is a sup-
plement to the phylogenetic method of classification. It
ensures that the specimen studied have a recent shared
past. Even though this control is tighter than with the
classifications of systematics alone, the same theoretical
and philosophical limitations apply: the description is
historical and does not ensure that the specimens have
the very same organizations. Nevertheless, several meth-
ods provide partial control over biological organizations.
For example, inbred strains are (almost) homogeneous
genetically, and some aspects of animal phenotypes are
controlled regularly in breeding institutions. Thus, these
methods provide precise knowledge and control over the
historical origin of the specimens studied and limited
direct control over their organizations.
3.3. Historical contexts
Knowledge and control of the past of organisms and
cells used in an experiment are not limited to their ge-
nealogy. Their past contexts are also relevant. By con-
text, we mean the environment, including the possible
interactions with other organisms. The control of past
contexts can go from the timescale of many generations
to the timescale of ontogenesis or even the shorter time
scales preceding the experiment.
In the case of cell culture, the control and knowledge
of the context stem first from the use of a standardized
medium, temperature, and protection from contamina-
tions. Even the choice of supplies such as centrifugal
tubes used with the medium can have dramatic conse-
quences on cellular behaviors (Soto et al., 1991). An-
other critical parameter is the density of cells. When
this density is too low, the lack of quorum effect can
change cellular behaviors. On the opposite, when the
density is too high, the cells constrain each other’s pro-
liferation. Moreover, cells typically need time to adjust
to a change of conditions such as a change of medium
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Figure 3: Observed and controlled genealogies. A: A schematic representation of strain breeding. Biologists use wild or domesticated specimens to start
controlled strains. In the case of inbred strains, there is no crossing with specimens external to the strain. In the case of outbred animals, some
diversity is regularly introduced. Substrains may be defined, either because they are the result of genetic manipulations, selection in outbred
strains, or just as the result of genetic drift. B: Controlled genealogies in the case of cells. Doing a standard subculture is not enough to ensure that the
individuals of a population share a recent common ancestor. To ensure a recent common ancestor, biologists typically perform a highly diluted
subculture which isolates a single cell. This cell and its descent proliferate, and their proliferation leads to a new population. This population can
then be frozen in order to stop biological processes, and in particular to stop proliferation and the associated variations (Soto et al., 2016a).
Subsets of this frozen population can be used to perform experiments and be shared with other laboratories. The cells obtained using this method
share a known, recent common ancestor and are often used to reproduce experiments.
Longo & Montévil (2011b). All these factors are impor-
tant since they determine the status of the cells subjected
to the experimentation. In order to perform controlled
experiments, experimenters choose an initial status that
can be obtained consistently in a cell population (homo-
geneity) and different replicates (reproducibility). The
most straightforward condition that can be obtained and
sustained consistently is unconstrained proliferation.
In the case of animals, the situation is similar to that
of cells. In laboratory conditions, the control of the con-
text includes typically the temperature, light cycle, the
nature and quantity of food, avoiding pathogens, and
the number of animals per cage. For example, Heindel
et al. (2015, section 2.6) describe the context in which
animals are raised before and during a large scale exper-
iment. However, their past context can be considered
problematic. This work aims to study the effects of the
endocrine-disrupting chemical bisphenol A (BPA). The
animal experimented upon are raised in BPA free cages,
but they originate from strains which are raised in poly-
carbonate cages by the animal provider, and polycarbon-
ate leaks BPA.The exposure of pregnant females to BPA
have known effects spanning two generations (“grand-
mother effect”, Susiarjo et al., 2007) and there are other
known and probably also unknown epigenetic factors.
Understanding the importance of past contexts re-
quires a short theoretical discussion on heredity. Un-
der the assumption that DNA sequences are the only
form of heredity, contexts before an experiment are
relevant only during development. However, this as-
sumption is not valid in general, and epigenetic inher-
itance is a widespread phenomenon (Jablonka & Raz,
2009; Jablonka et al., 2014; Danchin et al., In press). Let
us introduce a simple example that does not require re-
cent advances in epigenetics. MMTV is a retrovirus
which can be inherited exogenously from the milk of
an infected host to another animal, usually its descent
(Dudley et al., 2016). If, say, inbred mice are fed milk
from contaminated mice of another strain, then these
mice will carry MMTV and transmit it to their descent.
A contaminated female will lead to a substrain which
is genetically identical to the original inbred strain (as
long as the retrovirus does not alter mice DNA) but has
critical immunological and oncologic differences.
Many strategies such as working with inbred strains
or clonal cell populations strive for genetic uniformity.
These strategies could be extended formally to known
forms of epigenetic heredity. However, the knowledge
and control of past contexts over several generations is
an indirect, partial way to control known and unknown
epigenetic heredity, in combination with the control of
genealogies. As a conclusion, past contexts over several
generations are relevant.
The context at the timescale of one generation is also
relevant, as advocated by the concept of ecological de-
velopmental biology (Gilbert & Epel, 2009). Even the
position of a fetus relative to its male and female siblings
in the uterus has a measurable impact (Ryan & Vanden-
bergh, 2002). The context matters at shorter timescales
too. For example, to measure heart rate or blood pres-
sure on a rat, biologists need to take into account the
memory and anticipation associated with the procedure
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(Longo & Montévil, 2011b; Nadin, 2017, for conceptual
frameworks). In this particular case, the stress induced
by the measurement impacts the heart rate and can be
limited by training the animal, that is changing its antic-
ipations (Gross & Luft, 2003).
The context in which organisms and cells live before
the experiment matters from the timescale of several
generations to the timescales of development and physi-
ology. The work on past contexts complements the one
on genealogies as a method to manage the past of the
specimens studied. It follows that the same epistemolog-
ical limitations apply.
3.4. Synchronic aspects of measurement
Theaspects ofmeasurement discussed above aremostly
diachronic: they pertain to the past of objects. By con-
trast, this section analyses aspects relevant during the
observation of intended features.
3.4.1. Current context
Overall, the discussion in the previous section ap-
plies also to the context during an experiment. The con-
text contributes to the definition of the specimens and
quantities observed. This contribution is both practical
and theoretical. It is practical because it describes the
necessary operations required to perform the same mea-
surement beyond using the same apparatus and reading
its results. It is theoretical because the meaning of the
results depends on these operations.
To illustrate the importance of the context, let us
consider the example of mammal metabolism observed
by the oxygen consumption rate. This rate seems to
be a simple empirical quantity; however, it depends on
the activity of the organism observed and its relevant
components. To compare the metabolism of different
organisms, biologists define different kinds of physiolog-
ical activity. The target activities have to be meaningful
and achievable for all the organisms considered, which
may be difficult when measurement applies to the many
different species of a large clade. In all cases, the mean-
ing of the results depends on the nature of the activity
chosen (fig. 4). Metabolic rates have several definitions
(Longo & Montévil, 2014, chap. 2 for a review):
• The field metabolic rate (FMR) corresponds to
the activity of organisms in an ecosystem, without
constraints from the observer (fig. 4E1).
• The basal metabolic rate (BMR) considers organ-
isms at rest, that is to say, undisturbed, non-sleeping
organisms in a thermoneutral environment and
in a post-absorptive state. Evolution leads to a di-
versity in the activities of organisms and the BMR
levels down the impact of this diversity on the
metabolism (fig. 4E3). It is not always possible
to instantiate this definition; for example, rumi-
nants are never in post-absorptive state (fig. 4E2).
• The maximum metabolic rate (MMR) considers
the maximum level of sustainable activity. By fo-
cusing on the upper boundary of the metabolism,
only the determinants of this boundary are rele-
vant and not the various characters involved in
biological activities (fig. 4E4).
By choosing different contexts, biologists co-determine
what is observed even when the same measurement ap-
paratus is used to observe the same part. The BMR and
MMR show that it is even possible to choose observa-
tions that focus on properties shared by different species
by leveling down the weight of the organizational diver-
sity stemming from history.
3.4.2. Choosing or eliminating individuals
Filtering of individuals is a method to control strains:
breeders disregard animals with deleterious mutations,
diseases, or other peculiarities. Sometimes, onlyminimal
control over the past context and genealogy is possible.
For example, in humans, most methods above would
be unethical. Choosing individuals having specific char-
acteristics and eliminating individuals with unwanted
characteristics is an alternative method of control on the
organisms investigated.
Filtering of individuals is possible during experi-
ments; however, it impacts the meaning of the results.
For example, in the case of a toxicological experiment,
unexpected variations should be reported since they may
be relevant to understand the effect of the chemical stud-
ied and may be investigated in other studies. However,
if we want to study the “normal” physiology of insulin
after long-term exposure to high-sugar diet, then it is
necessary to rule out diabetic animals. Last, the quanti-
ties of interest cannot be measured at the expected time
point in the case of individuals who meet an untimely
death, which is an uncontrolled filter.
Filtering of individuals by their properties is a com-
plementary way to control biological objects. Perform-
ing this filtering enables biologists to discard specimens
which have gone through unwanted variations, or which
have not gone through expected variations. Criteria
can range from developmental anomalies, mutations,
pathologies to animals frightened during measurement.
3.4.3. Data acquisition
Biological measurements typically provide quanti-
ties, and this process has an anhistorical dimension that
is comparable to physics. The notion of measurement
of classical physics is relevant in biology. When mea-
suring a continuous quantity such as the velocity, the
measurement is never exact and provides an interval in-
stead of a single quantity (§ 2.1). Other physical notions
such as reference frames can also be relevant. Wagner
(2010) and Houle et al. (2011) fruitfully import concepts
of measurement theory in biology which are relevant for
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Figure 4: Different measurements of the same quantity. A: A schematic representation of the appearance and disappearance of relevant characters. Dotted
lines represent relations of homology. White shapes are characters which disappeared. B: Four different ways to measure a quantity 𝑞. S1 and S1’ are
two similar specimens. All represented characters impact 𝑞. The size of a symbol represents the impact of the corresponding character on 𝑞 in the
given context. E1: A measurement performed without specific care for the characters contributing to 𝑞, e.g., the field metabolic rate. E2: A
measurement performed in a standardized way for S1 but not for the other species. E3: The animal performs no specific activity which reduces
the weight of several characters, e.g., the basal metabolic rate. In this case, only homologous characters remain quantitatively relevant. E4: A
constraint dominates the determination of the measured quantity despite the diversity of relevant characters, e.g., the maximum metabolic rate.
the synchronic aspect of measurement. Since these as-
pects are not properly biological, we will not develop
them further here.
The principle of variation implies that an observed
feature can become ill-defined or acquire a different
meaning. Here, biology goes beyond standard mea-
surement theory since the changes of biological objects
lead to a collapse of the original meaning of the quanti-
ties observed. For example, the heart rate is defined by
beat-to-beat intervals, but pathological situations such
as torsade de pointes escape the standard definition of
a heartbeat, and the notion of heart rate becomes ill-
defined. Similarly, the properties of the hind legs of the
bipedal goat discussed above have a different meaning
than in its quadruped counterparts.
Last, most experimental protocols in biology use con-
trol groups which are not subjected to the transforma-
tions investigated (Johnson & Besselsen, 2002). Control
groups enable experimenters to assess the organization
of specimens having the same historical origin and ex-
posed to the same context than the organisms subjected
to a putative difference maker. Controls enable biolo-
gists to estimate whether the results stem from the con-
text, spontaneous variations, or conditions tested. Bi-
ological objects are labile, and control groups are the
closest reference point possible to the objects tested.
3.5. Irreducibility of biological variation
Despite the use of methodologies providing tight
control over biological objects, the principle of varia-
tion entails that there are always possible qualitative
variations. Variations can impact the observed features
directly, making them variable, changing their mean-
ing or even possibly making them ill-defined. Popula-
tions which are too similar are evidence of malpractice
(Bolland et al., 2016). When observing a given feature
among several specimens, biologists report “not applica-
ble” (NA) for a specimen when qualitative variations are
too significant. For example, pathological heartbeats
that do not follow the same sequence of events that reg-
ular heartbeats lead to beat-to-beat intervals that do not
have the same meaning. This kind of departures appears
for theoretical reasons and not only as a result of experi-
mental errors or as the result of the improper theoretical
definition of the target quantities.
Observable, qualitative variations can be shown ex-
perimentally even for clonal cells, for example as a result
of asymmetries in cellular division (Cai et al., 2006; Stew-
art et al., 2005; Lindner et al., 2008; Soto et al., 2016a)
or for dynamical reasons (Braun, 2015). Of course, the
development of multicellular organisms also leads to a
high level of variations. Variations occur even when com-
paring an individual with itself at another time point,
even in the case of close time points. For example, many
physiological time series are non-stationary (West, 2006;
Longo & Montévil, 2014). Stationary time series follow
the same distribution over time which implies that the
mean is a stable quantity. By contrast, non-stationarity
implies that assessing the average at different times will
not necessarily yield the same results. As a consequence,
it is not possible to characterize an organism by precise
values of physiologic quantities, and precise results are
only valid at a specific time point.
3.6. Recapitulation
To sum our theoretical approach up, biological mea-
surement has to accommodate simultaneously the aspect
observed and the organism in which it takes place. We
propose the following principles :
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Figure 5: Recapitulation of the diachronic elements used to define the objects of a typical experiment. The whole construct illustrated is required to describe
the measurement performed. A: The objects are the result of an evolutionary history, which is not directly accessible but can be estimated by the
phylogenetic method. B: Specimens of a given species can be used to breed a strain in controlled conditions. C: Elements of this strain are used
in an experiment to obtain data.
1. Measurement has a synchronic dimension for the
aspect or part of interest (§ 3.4.3). Usually, the
concept of measurement from classical physics is
relevant, that is to say, measurement as limited
precision. Concepts of measurement theory can
also be used (Houle et al., 2011).
2. The measurement is relative to/constituted by the
history and contexts of the organisms of interest.
Historicity, here, means a cascade of context-dependent,
qualitative variations. A measurement includes a
specific way to manipulate and describe these con-
texts and natural histories, for example, referring
to a theoretical or concrete common ancestor.
(a) Genealogy handles an uncontrolled history that
is shared by the different organisms studied.
Methods include the phylogenetic classifica-
tion (§ 3.1) and direct genealogical control in
the case of strains and cell lines (§ 3.2).
(b) Past and current contexts (environment/interac-
tions) can be (partially) known in the field or
controlled in laboratories or breeding institu-
tions. Relevant contexts include past contexts
over several generations, during the develop-
ment or shortly before observations (§ 3.3),
and current contexts, during the experiment
and observations (§ 3.4.1).
(c) Choosing or eliminating individuals can be used
to observe or eliminate specific histories or
variations (pathological cases, unwanted be-
havior, ontogenetic or phylogenetic histories,
etc., § 3.4.2).
3. Uncontrolled variations can always impact themea-
surement, including the very definition of the fea-
tures observed (§ 3.5).
4. Discussion
4.1. The radical materiality of biological phenomena
The role of matter in experiments is critical to their
epistemological analysis (Morgan, 2002). In physics, the-
ories define objects mathematically, by invariants and
invariant preserving transformations. This epistemolog-
ical structure justifies that the same theoretical object
can be instantiated independently de novo. For example,
the speed of light in the vacuum can be assessed on two
independent light beams: it is an invariant of the the-
ory. By contrast, biological objects stem from an history.
It follows that empirical knowledge in biology cannot
be abstracted from concrete material objects (tokens)
materializing this history. In this perspective, biologi-
cal phenomena display a radical materiality (Soto et al.,
2016b). Our discussion on biological measurement il-
lustrates this idea. Biological names, in systematics, are
not defined by a theoretical construct, they are defined
by specific specimens called name-bearing types (§ 3.1).
Then, experimenting with individuals of a species associ-
ated with this name means experimenting on individuals
which descend from an ancestor shared by both the spec-
imens experimented upon and the name-bearing type.
These specimens possess a diachronic, material continu-
ity over time: the genealogy. The same reasoning applies
to the controlled strains and cell lines; the exchange
of living specimens between laboratories is the further
materialization of this philosophical idea.
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In general, we can distinguish between different cat-
egories of theoretical situations in the relationship be-
tween matter and theoretical definitions. The methods
to reproduce observations characterize them:
1. The description of objects is generic, and the same
theoretical object can be instantiated empirically
twice without communication of matter, as dis-
cussed by Feynman & Gleick (1967, chap. 4). It is
the case in current physical theories.
2. The object’s behavior is the specific result of a his-
tory.
(a) Scientists use the permanence of the material
object studied. They may be fixed artificially.
For example, the name-bearing types used in
systematics serve as static references for fu-
ture observations. They may also continue to
change over time, for example, in the case of
the biosphere.
(b) The objects reproduce. This property provides
an exponential amount of objects sharing a
common past. The study of living organisms
and cells falls typically in this category (case
studies such as types above are an exception).
4.2. Symmetry and symmetrisation
Symmetries play a central role in physics (Feynman
& Gleick, 1967; Van Fraassen, 1989; Bailly & Longo,
2011; Longo &Montévil, 2014) and will enable us to pro-
vide a more in-depth analysis of biological measurement.
Symmetries are transformations which do not change
the relevant aspects of a given object. For example, the
equation describing free fall does not change for an ex-
periment performed one century ago or today. Time
translation is a transformation that does not change the
theoretical description of the object: a symmetry. More-
over, the same equation applies regardless of the nature
of the object which is another fundamental symmetry.
For example, concerning free fall, if experimenters re-
place an iron bead with another one, or a copper or wood
bead, the phenomenon remains the same: permuting
(interchanging) these objects is a symmetry. Symmetries
can be either exact, in the sense that they stem from fun-
damental principles, or approximate.
The concept of experimental reproducibility is a no-
tion of symmetry. The reproducibility of an experiment
means that the same set of observations can be performed
by different observers, on different material objects, at
different times and places.
Moreover, in a given experiment, biologists typically
use different specimens exposed to the same conditions
in order to perform statistical tests. The tests assume that
these specimens follow the same probability distribution,
that is, the tests assume that behind the quantitative
variations observed there is a single abstract mathemati-
cal object (the probability distribution): this is again an
assumption of symmetry.
However, biological objects are the result of a history
and continue to generate a history. Interpreting this
notion in terms of symmetries leads to assert that when
time flows, describing the changes of biological objects
can require changes of symmetry that do not stem from
the description of the initial objects. These changes are
the core of the principle of variation (Longo &Montévil,
2011a; Montévil et al., 2016; Montévil, 2018). As hinted
to in the introduction, these variations conflict with the
aim to perform reproducible experiments. In biology
unlike in physics, the symmetries associated with repro-
ducibility are not granted theoretically. Instead, they de-
pend on the measurement as summarized in section 3.6.
Since biological regularities aremore labile than phys-
ical ones, symmetries are not provided directly by the the-
ory. Instead, they are co-established by themeasurement
process and the biological objects used. We propose to
call this practical and theoretical operation “symmetriza-
tion”. Biologists typically work on specimens of the same
species or more generally specimens with a shared com-
mon past. In experiments, they assume a partial equiva-
lence between these specimens and how they are orga-
nized. In other words, biologists posit an approximate
symmetry between the organization of different organ-
isms and their response to experiments. Control over
past contexts is also a symmetrization of the specimens
studied and are often designed with this issue in mind.
For example, in section 3.3, we have discussed how bi-
ologists aim for cells in vitro to be in a consistent state
over time, that is to say, how biologists symmetrize cells.
The different methods described in section 3 should be
seen as different symmetrizations.
Different symmetrizations can be performed during
an experiment or even during data acquisition. Choos-
ing a symmetrization or another endows the results with
entirely different biological meanings. Figure 4 illus-
trates this idea and shows different ways to make organ-
isms equivalent. In figure 4E1, by being in the field, or-
ganisms express their historically (evolutionary) relevant
activities and these activities are diverse. In figure 4E3,
different organisms are mostly restrained to activities
that are common to them: the experimenter performs a
stronger symmetrization by limiting the characters in-
volved in the determination of the observed quantity.
We can distinguish two kinds of symmetrization:
concrete and epistemic symmetrizations. Concrete sym-
metrizations involve the action of biologists on objects.
For example, establishing inbred strains is a concrete
symmetrization of genomes, and the symmetrizations
illustrated in figure 4 are also concrete symmetrizations.
By contrast, epistemic symmetrizations do not change
material objects and are limited to determining what
is considered equivalent, that is to say, symmetric by
permutation. For example, we mentioned that the po-
sition of a fetus in utero has measurable consequences.
Taking this aspect into account or not corresponds to
different epistemic symmetrizations. The concept of
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epistemic symmetrization is particularly relevant for sta-
tistical analyses and subsequent biological reasonings.
As a consequence of the principle of variation, the
concept of epistemic symmetrization is always relevant:
biologists have to symmetrize organisms which are not
genuinely symmetric. Concrete symmetrizations occur
in most experiments, but not in observations without
experiments such as the observation of specimens in
systematics. Performing concrete symmetrization con-
strains the kind of biological objects studied. For ex-
ample, it is far easier to symmetrize cells in culture by
maintaining unconstrained proliferation.
In conclusion, biological measurement as summa-
rized in 3.6 describes both the concrete and epistemic
symmetrizations performed to obtain experimental re-
sults and endow them with biological meaning.
4.3. Measurement strategies
Baxendale (2018) proposes to map scientific practices
on a continuum of strategies defined by their stances con-
cerning reductionism. In this section, we apply a similar
approach to measurement strategies. Our concept of bi-
ological measurement leads to the notion that measure-
ment depends on symmetrizations, but symmetrizations
can be performed more or less tightly and at different
levels. To represent these strategies, we propose to or-
ganize measurement strategies along three axes as illus-
trated in figure 6. In this section, we discuss only the
different measurement strategies, and we do not imply
that they necessarily succeed or that they prevent the
joint use of other strategies.
The first axis describes whether the measurement is
variable or on the opposite reproducible. Here, repro-
ducibility means that the measurement generates data
consistently with different specimens. For example, us-
ing inbred strains generally leads to more reproducible
results than wild specimens.
The second axis describes whether the measurement
targets singular or general objects. Working on the
metabolic rate of mammals is more general than work-
ing on a single species by measuring wild specimens.
Both are more general than outbred strains and a fortiori
inbred strains, where the genotype is symmetrized. Re-
ciprocally, inbred strains are more singular than outbred
strains and so on.
The last axis assesses whether the measurement de-
fines objects coherent with their evolutionary past or
instead whether the objects are more or less profoundly
altered. For example, inbred strains are homozygotes
for all genes which is not the case of mammals in their
evolutionary history. Similarly, the basal metabolic rate
is far less representative of a species past evolution than
the field metabolic rate — but the latter depends on the
field.
A qualitative axis emerges in this three-dimensional
space, see figure 6. This axis is given by the strategies
which increase simultaneously the reproducibility, singu-
larity, and alterations associated with the measurement.
In other words, these strategies lose generality and alter
the specimens in order to increase the reproducibility of
the measurement. At the limit, these strategies aim to
generate specimens which are as symmetrized as possi-
ble and would have the same status than the objects of
physics: these strategies aim the genericization of bio-
logical organizations and use many methods to reduce
diversity. For example, in the case of cells, samples are
frozen to prevent spontaneous variations between exper-
iments. The focus on model organisms at the level of the
research community is also a collective strategy of gener-
icization. In situations like clinical trials, on humans,
genericization methods are limited for ethical reasons.
In contrast to genericization strategies, other strategies
on the same axis aim to gain generality and coherence
with evolutionary history but at the cost of more vari-
ability in the results. It follows that these strategies face
more difficulties to obtain statistically significant results.
In order to face the reproducibility crisis and to ob-
tain significant results with fewer animals, it is common
to promote strategies genericizing specimens (Festing,
2014; Chia et al., 2005). However, these strategies bear
the cost of studying singular organizations: the results
obtained may not even be representative of the species
studied, and we have seen that strains of the same species
have distinct properties. Another example is that the con-
ditions of the laboratory reduce exposure to pathogens
in order to symmetrize the life history of animals stud-
ied, which is part of the alteration axis. However, this
situation leads to immunological functions that differ
from wild animals (Abolins et al., 2010).
The genericization of specimens aims, at the limit,
to study a single, reproducible organization and is thus
highly singular. Results may depend on the specificities
of these organizations and their contexts in unknown
ways. Therefore, these strategies are vulnerable to minor
departures from the genericization performed initially.
For example, performing measurement in different labo-
ratories always involve a change of context despite the
explicit control of many factors. Genericizations aim
reproducibility in the sense of specimens that are very
similar, but the reproducibility of experiments is made
difficult by the lack of generality of the measurement.
In figure 6, there are only two cases which are far
from this axis. The first corresponds to measurements
like the basal metabolic rate, see figure 4E3. This mea-
surement is reproducible and nevertheless general. Its
downside is that the organisms are put in a specific state
to level down the consequences of the diversity of the
characters impacting the measured quantity. Its strategy
is to symmetrize a shared aspect of organisms when the
genericizations discussed above symmetrize complete
organizations.
Case studies are the second strategy departing from
the main axis. Case studies focus on a single individual
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Figure 6: Different measurement strategies. The three axes correspond to measurements that are reproducible vs. variable, general vs. singular and
coherent with their evolutionary past vs. altered by experimenters. LEFT: axis where many strategies lie. On one end of the spectrum, these
strategies aim to produce specimens that are as close to each other as possible by controlling them tightly. On the other end, experimenters relax
this control and aim to make more general measurements. RIGHT: different cases are represented in the space describing measurement strategies.
Most measurement strategies are on the axis represented on the left, but departures from this axis are equally interesting since they represent
other ways to approach biological phenomena empirically, e.g., case studies.
and reproducibility is not a goal. For example, Patterson
& Linden (1981) study the intelligence of non-human
primates. To do so, the authors did not develop stan-
dardized conditions and protocols. Instead, they taught
sign language to several specimens and focused on a par-
ticularly gifted gorilla, Koko, who mastered up to 2000
symbols. Other examples are works on types in system-
atics, the study of the bipedal goat discussed by West-
Eberhard (2003) and the cloned sheep, Dolly, which is
one success among 277 attempts and remained the only
success for a long time (Wilmut et al., 1997). While
the study of types does not involve alterations, teaching
Koko or cloning a sheep do: case studies are diverse for
the third axis.
Case studies are sometimes neglected by experimenters
who strive to design reproducible experiments in or-
der to study mechanisms. For example, the success of
cloning Dolly without reproducing this feat led to an
intense debate, especially when evidence accumulated
that Dolly was indeed cloned from an adult cell (Solter,
1998). However, in our conceptual framework, case stud-
ies have a specific epistemic role. They are sufficient
to prove the existence of a possibility in a theoretical
context where biological possibilities are not predefined
(Montévil, 2018). The bipedal goat shows the extent of
developmental plasticity and studying a type is sufficient
to defend the existence of a new species. Case studies can
be extensive; for example, the anatomy of the bipedal
goat has been described in details. In case studies, the
analysis of a single part in several organisms is typically
replaced by the analysis of many parts or aspects in a
single organism. Last, the study of types in systematics
plays a pivotal role in the general architecture of biolog-
ical knowledge to name biological objects.
Representing different measurement strategies by the
symmetrizations performed is fruitful. These strategies
are different responses to the difficulties raised by the
historical and varying nature of biological objects.
5. Conclusion
Our theoretical notion of measurement accommo-
dates how biologists manipulate immensely complex
objects, organisms and cells typically, which are the re-
sult of a history and continue to produce a history by
generating qualitative variations. The concept of bio-
logical measurement which we propose accommodates
simultaneously the organisms or cells and their part or
aspect of interest which may be quantified. In our frame-
work, a measurement is relative to a history and context.
To develop reproducible experiments, biologists observe
specimens with a shared past. This shared past is as-
certained by systematics and by direct knowledge and
control of both their genealogy and past contexts. In
the study of objects defined by their history, the objects
which can be considered equivalent are objects having a
shared past. In this context, we call symmetrization the
concrete and theoretical operations which establish and
posit the equivalence of different objects with more or
less tightly controlled shared pasts and contexts. Sym-
metrization also includes the operations performed dur-
ing the observation which can constrain and structure
variability.
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The notion of biological measurement is compatible
with different research strategies and leads to a frame-
work to map them. In this framework, we find two polar
opposites. In one end, strategies strive to genericize bi-
ological organizations at the cost of studying singular
organizations and altering them. To implement these
strategies, biologists developed a plethora of methods.
They expose objects to similar contexts and ensure that
they have recent, controlled common ancestors. In some
cases, biologists freeze samples to prevent them from un-
dergoing variations between experiments. On the other
end of the spectrum, the objects studied are more gen-
eral (e.g., diverse genetically) and coherent with their
evolutionary history, but they are also more variable.
There are strategies which escape this opposition, for
example, case studies or methods to level down the di-
versity relevant for the part studied while the rest of the
organizations remain diverse.
Having a clear notion of what it means to access
biological objects empirically is critical for biological
knowledge. In this paper, we provide only an outline
of biological measurement, and this notion deserves fur-
ther discussions, focusing on both general and specific
situations. Nevertheless, since our notion builds on
solid ground, namely the theory of evolution and ex-
tensions for organisms, we hope that our work will be of
use for further research. We have shown that biological
measurement has significant differences with the notions
of measurement in physics. Depending on the perspec-
tive, biological measurement may be seen as an exten-
sion of classical measurement in order to accommodate
the historicity and variability of biological objects, or
as a different concept altogether because the objects are
not described theoretically by underlying equations. In
all cases, acknowledging the specificities of biological
measurement should provide new systematic ways to ap-
proach biological observations critically and ultimately
to promote experimental reproducibility.
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